Exactly one year to go until the first presidential vuelta of 2023. In Argentina, an eternity. Four years ago it seemed that Macri could be reelected aun with difficulties because Peronism/Kirchnerism did not find the agujero al mate. A few years ago, Massa was the future president of the country. Only 12 months ago Milei was a showy phenomenon, for a good choice in the CABA; he today he is the clear third that dilutes the polarization at the national level. In July, the Index of Trust in the Government of the Universidad Di Tella –which leads the political scientist Carlos Gervasoni– marked the lowest point of the Alberto Fernández stage; now in october he takes three straight months of light recovery. As will be seen, the unbearable weight of being in a liquid era.
In an Argentina with a 100% annual projected inflation, among other serious social problems, there are no banderazos, bocinazos, cacerolazos, or spontaneous looting activities. A society without energy, agonized, beaten, with three frustrations at costs (CFK, Macri and Alberto mandates), is not for great mobilizations, not revolutions, with all that implies positively or negatively. Despite the fact that every day receives a dose of inflationary electroshock and that the prospects are not gratifying –increases in public services in the port– the question of whether the citizenry is ready for a policy of economic shock, due to its disenfranchised feeling . One data that draws the attention of casual observers is that the productive market has tended towards more jobs and lower wages: it has been adjusted for price, so that consumption is not depleted so much. A social collective that prefers to let more people in at the least cost, what is indicating about the preferred social model in a crisis situation?, is it not a result of an implicit social pact between capital and work that expresses a symbolic value? Tarea for the home for presidential candidates.
The week that is concluding was seen from all over the Argentine political system, a series of Titanes in the Ring version 2.0, of all against all, where the most powerful conflicts were between parties and coalitions, which inter. In a corner, the archiconocido official chaos, with Máximo vs. Alberto, CFK distancing himself from decisions of his own government, officials who leave for a meeting, trips and tours with the PASO, etc. “Yyyyyyyyyy en este rincónnnnnnnnnn” would say a classic boxing presenter, the structural conflict of Juntos por el Cambio. Is it structural? Yes, because there are still unresolved debates on central questions –which are not the candidatures– the conceptual differences are emerging week by week, while the scenario opens a window of opportunity.
Someone within the opposition coalition would have the right to decide that diversity is managed in an alliance. But the problem is that being the most probable winner of the next presidential election, there is a growing public that asks itself with legitimacy: “Is it going to govern?
But it didn’t all end there, because the decision to settle taxes raised suspicions with its withdrawal from the precinct to debate the Presupuesto, based on the argument that once people voted against it in general, the rest was done. He left many weak flanks that together took advantage of their chaos. How much more up you go on the stage, more risks if running and greater professionalism is required, at least not to pay the cost of walking having to explain equivocal situations. In favor of Milei plays a fastidio with the status quo so great – and replicates in various parts of the world in these days – that she still has a mattress. If this Sunday there were elections –and the polls were reliable– Milei could come out third with 20% of the votes. Saving the distances, there would be a third of the size of Massa in 2015. Isn’t it llamativo? Is it not that society polarizes when another falls, until a third in disagreement appears that relativizes the crystallized frame? If it actually happened within a year of the current photo, it should be said that 2019 was more an anomaly than a normality.
In the week of triple chaos, three other important questions were filtered.
One theme: officialism launched a fight against the Judiciary in general, but it clearly has the eternal pulse against this Supreme Court. The expertise of the Frente de Todos is curious to achieve the unit of four courtesans who are very far from each other. Without names, a judge systematically excuses himself in various causes, a local judge imitates him in his behavior by the logic of power, and many fallos fall in the hands of the others of the others. Danger with the fallos signed only by two, because there is no majority…
Theme 2: Macri’s book. I am of those who continue to think that the former president is closer to being an elector and an ideological guide than a candidate, but he will also depend on what the other aspirants to the sillón of Rivadavia hold. The central point of what are the conceptual differences that it plants within Juntos.
How much part of the coalition thought that the problem was gradualism and the absence of a shock? If Macri imposes the logic of shock, will he be able to unify the PvC with a government of a single party with the weakness that this implies? Does the majority of this alliance have a more moderate / center / social democratic vision? Danger because this will be the background debate from here to a year.
Theme 3: we continue with the saga of “what do we do with the PASO?”.
There are several academic researchers who observe that the fall of the great ideologies of the twentieth century worldwide has led to a tribalization of politics. This week we saw an expression of tribes in conflict, without systems of articulation of interests for the construction of a collective. Meanwhile, the actors are arranged as they can with implicit social pacts.
*Political consultant. Former president of Asacop.
You may also be interested